SOME  NOTES 

ON  THE  SOLUTION  OF 

TACTICAL  PROBLEMS 


DEPARTMENT  OF  MILITARY  ART 
THE  ARMY  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 


Press  of  The  Army  Service  Schools 
Fort   Leavenworth,    Kansas 

1916 


SOME  NOTES 

ON  THE  SOLUTION  OF 

TACTICAL  PROBLEMS 

=  t>y  ,1      V4.  "£..    F-.'aKc.-. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  MILITARY  ART 
THE  ARMY  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 


Press  of  The  Army  Service  Schools 
Fort  Lcavenworth,  Kansas 


1916 


ft 


Some  Notes  on  the  Solution  of 
Tactical  Problems 

Lecture  by  Captain  H.  B.  Fiske,  28th  Infantry. 


IN  the  field,  tactical  problems  of  greater  or  lesser 
importance  are  continually  being  solved  by  offi- 
cers of  all  ranks,  from  the  supreme  command 
down  through  the  intermediate  grades  to  that  of 
captain,  and  even  within  the  company  by  those  in 
charge  of  its  patrols,  its  pickets,  and  its  other  de- 
tachments. Every  time  the  captain  deploys  his  com- 
pany, except  at  a  merely  mechanical  drill,  every  time 
he  stations  his  company  as  an  outpost  or  as  a  sup- 
port thereof,  every  time  he  is  assigned  a  task  on  the 
general  duty  of  security,  or  makes  any  new  disposi- 
tions therein,  he  is  compelled  to  arrive  at  a  tactical 
decision,  which  can  be  reached  only  by  the  solution  of 
a  new  problem.  That  problem  may  be  solved  without 
much  conscious  use  of  reason ;  but  in  any  case,  how- 
ever simple  the  propess,  the  process  nevertheless 
is  there.  And  as  one  goes  up  in  the  hierarchy  of  rank, 
the  problems  presented  for  solution  are  of  constantly 
increasing  importance,  if  not,  of  frequency. 

Unless  there  has  been  extended  training  in  the 
solution  of  problems,  even  the  simplest  one  is  liable 
to  strike  vacant  the  mind  of  the  one  who  is  suddenly 
confronted  with  the  responsibility  for  its  solution. 
Who  has  not  seen  the  untrained  officer,  in  the  face 
of  such  a  necessity,  utterly  unable  to  grasp  any  idea 
as  to  his  proper  action?  And  yet  the  solution  may 
be  tactically  so  simple  as  to  be  solved  instantly  by  the 
trained  mind  and  almost  by  intuition.  Still,  while 

3  333435 


the  situation  may  be  simple  and  the  answer  axio- 
matic to  the  man  who  knows,  yet,  like  most  military 
operations,  upon  its  correct  solution  depend  perhaps 
many  lives.  The  nation  that  sends  its  men  into  war 
under  officers  untrained  in  the  solution  of  tactical 
problems  is  carrying  a  tremendous  responsibility; 
and  so  likewise  does  the  officer  who  neglects  to  ac- 
quire all  possible  previous  training. 

No  amount  of  study  of  the  theory  alone  of  the 
art  will,  by  itself,  fit  one  to  meet  the  emergencies  of 
war  with  skill  and  certainty.  To  acquire  such,  not 
only  must  its  principles  be  learned,  but  the  habit,  as 
well,  of  their  application  to  concrete  cases  must  be 
established.  A  man  might  read  volumes  on  how  to 
lay  brick,  but  he  could  hardly  attain  skill  thereat 
until  he  has  long  experience  in  the  actual  handling 
of  his  trowel.  The  military  mind,  like  the  mason's 
hand,  requires  practice  in  the  use  of  its  tactical  tools 
to  acquire  dexterity. 

We  do  not  have  to  wait  for  war  to  present  its 
vital  problems  in  order  to  begin  the  training  of  our 
officers  in  applied  tactics.  But  the  teaching  of  tac- 
tics in  time  of  peace  by  application  to  concrete  situa- 
tions requires  no  defense.  To  confound  the  critics 
of  that  system,  one  need  but  to  point  to  the  German 
Army,  and  to  the  map  of  Europe  today. 

The  following  extract  on  the  value  of  tactical 
studies,  is  taken  from  the  introduction  to  Buddecke's 
Tactical  Decisions: 

"However  high  may  be  the  duties  which  come 
to  an  officer  in  the  departments  of  education,  instruc- 
tion, administration  and  scientific  investigation,  he 
nevertheless  enters  upon  the  activity  corresponding 
to  the  real  character  of  his  calling  only  when  he 
exercises  command  of  troops  and  when  he  exercises 
such  command  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  It 
must  be  the  aim  of  every  officer  to  become  at  some 


—5— 

time  a  commander,  to  become  a  responsible  leader 
in  action. 

"For  this  purpose  he  needs,  in  addition  to  the 
development  of  peculiar  personal  characteristics  and 
in  addition  to  experience  and  service  with  troops,  be- 
fore all  else,  a  thorough  tactical  education. 

"The  tactical  instruction  which  an  officer  gains 
in  military  schools  and  with  troops  is  not  alone  suffi- 
cient. Study  on  his  own  part  must  be  added.  The 
tactician  has  need,  in  his  profession,  of  steady  and 
uninterrupted  training  in  order  both  to  preserve 
and  to  develop  his  powers  once  he  has  discovered 
them.  The  commander  receives  his  education  not 
only  in  the  saddle,  but  also  at  his  desk.  This  is 
proved  by  illustrious  examples  of  celebrated  com- 
manders. 

"Military  history  offers  inexhaustible  material 
to  the  officer  who  wishes  to  pursue  his  education  4n 
tactics.  It  leads  him  directly  to  the  conditions  of 
war  and,  by  showing  the  ever-changing  relations 
between  cause  and  effect,  brings  him  to  a  realization 
of  the  conditions  upon  which  success  and  failure 
depend. 

"Military  history,  however,  offers  only  what 
is  finished  and  completed.  The  mental  activity 
exercised  in  its  study  is  a  reproductive  one  and  its 
value  to  the  student  depends  directly  upon  the  extent 
to  which  he  is  able  to  grasp  and  synthesize  the  real 
conditions  and  their  relations  and  to  enter  into  the 
thoughts  of  the  leading  personalities. 

"The  education  of  the  tactician  demands,  in 
addition  to  this,  a  productive  activity,  in  the  exer- 
cise of  which  he  is  confronted  by  questions  still  un- 
solved, which  he  himself  must  solve.  Therein  lies 
the  worth  of  tactical  problems,  which  are  the  more 
valuable  the  nearer  the  conditions  approach  those 
of  actual  warfare  and  the  more  latitude  they  give 
for  the  exercise  of  judgment  and  decision.  They 
must  provide  the  student  with  the  means  of  develop- 
ing his  tactical  judgment  and  of  gaining  practice  in 
the  use  of  forms. 

"The  tactician  needs  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
the  fundamental  principles  to  build  on  as  well  as  the 


faculty  of  rightly  applying  them.  Through  unculti- 
vated genius  alone,  which  pays  no  attention  to  form, 
he  will  never  become  equal  to  the  difficult  problems 
of  a  serious  crisis.  Still  less  will  the  mere  theorist 
be  able  to  fill  the  position  if  his  powers  be  limited 
to  the  knowledge  of  formal  tactics. 

"That  power  of  decision  and  action  which  is 
able  to  cope  with  all  the  situations  of  war  is  gained 
only  by  developing  the  ability  to  form  a  judgment 
in  technical  matters  with  certainty. 

"Therefore  tactics  is  an  art  to  be  learned.  Like 
every  other  art,  it  demands  a  measure  of  talent,  and 
the  highest  stage  of  perfection  can  be  reached  only 
by  those  highly  gifted  at  the  start.  In  spite  of  this, 
however,  the  less  gifted  can,  through  practice,  gain 
a  considerable  degree  of  facility,  and  many  a  tac- 
tician has  only  begun  to  find  out  his  powers  as  he 
advanced  in  the  knowledge  of  his  profession.  Here 
also,  one  may  say :  'industry  is  genius/ 

"It  should  therefore  be  the  aim  of  every  officer 
to  progress  through  the  individual  study  of  tactics 
and  thus  prepare  himself  for  the  highest  duties  of 
his  calling." 

The  following  is  from  the  introduction  to 
Gizycki's  problems: 

"It  would  be  impossible  to  over-estimate  the 
value  of  the  services  rendered  by  General  von  Verdy 
in  securing  a  general  adoption  of  the  applicatory 
method  of  instruction  for  the  training  of  our  officers 
in  strategy  and  tactics. 

"The  varying  nature  of  the  terrain  and  the  di- 
versity of  the  problems  which  war  presents,  render 
impossible  the  adoption  of  any  one  theory  to  cover 
all  the  possible  conditions  of  war.  Even  were  it 
possible  to  set  up  such  a  system,  it  could  never  be 
applied  in  any  particular  instance;  since,  being  de- 
rived by  a  process  of  abstraction  from  a  multipli- 
city of  cases,  it  could  only  contain  that  which  was 
common  to  all  such  cases  and  hence  would  never 
fit  exactly  any  concrete  case;  and  in  war  it  is  with 
concrete  cases  alone  that  we  have  to  deal.  For  this 
reason,  the  very  best  of  theories  can  only  serve  as  a 


—7— 

sort  of  general  guide.  Each  special  case  has  to  be 
thought  out  and  analyzed  in  all  its  parts.  Out  of 
our  critical  examination  of  the  situation  should  grow 
our  decision,  which  we  should  never  attempt  to  de- 
duce from  preconceived  abstract  principles. 

"He  who  seeks  to  become  a  leader  of  troops 
should  therefore  develop  the  following  qualifications : 

"1.  The  ability  to  reach  a  clear  and  intelligent 
decision. 

"2.  The  ability  to  communicate  this  decision 
clearly  and  unmistakably  to  others. 

"3.  The  necessary  knowledge  to  enable  him  to 
lead  the  troops  so  as  to  carry  out  his  intentions. 

"Clausewitz  has  clearly  delineated,  in  his  un- 
excelled work  'On  War',  the  special  traits  of  charac- 
ter which  are  requisite  for  the  forming  of  resolute 
decisions,  as  well  as  for  their  execution  (courage, 
enterprise,  confidence).  General  von  Verdy  makes 
the  following  suggestion  as  to  the  best  method  for 
the  development  of  these  three  mental  qualities : 

"  'By  constant  practice  in  the  solving  of  particu- 
lar problems  bring  out  the  infinite  variety  of  possible 
situations;  by  means  of  these  bring  out  the  nature 
of  war  and  thus,  by  inciting  the  student  to  formulate 
a  large  number  of  definite  decisions  and  orders, 
seek  to  develop  the  above  mentioned  qualifications.' 

"This  method  of  instruction  in  strategy  and 
tactics  is  beyond  question  the  wisest  to  adopt,  but  is 
undeniably  slow  and  toilsome ;  for  in  concrete  cases 
of  this  character,  whether  the  problems  are  set  by 
the  solver  himself,  given  him  by  another,  or  taken 
from  military  history,  it  is  not  sufficient  for  him  sim- 
ply to  arrive  at  a  decision  which  conforms  merely  to 
the  general  outlines  of  the  situation ;  by  that  alone 
little  would  be  gained.  The  thorough  student  must 
throw  himself  heart  and  soul  into  the  situation  which 
confronts  the  commander,  with  the  inner  eye  trans- 
form the  map  into  actual  ground,  rouse  his  imagina- 
tion to  a  vivid  realization  of  the  situation  with  all  its 
unavoidable  frictions  which  are  inseparable  from 
war,  and  then — reckon  correctly  as  regards  space 
and  time. 


—8— 

"By  a  thorough  course  of  this  sort,  the  student 
will  acquire  in  time  so  great  a  facility  in  estimating 
a  war  situation  that  he  will  be  able  to  form  a  correct 
judgment  with  great  rapidity;  in  fact,  almost  in- 
stinctively. The  immeasurable  advantage  thereby 
obtained  becomes  apparent  when  we  consider  that 
seldom,  in  war,  is  there  time  for  long  deliberation, 
and  that  the  decision  must  in  most  cases  be  quickly 
made  and  as  quickly  executed." 

We  cannot,  in  time  of  peace,  simulate  or  pre- 
sent anything  adequate  to  take  the  place  of  the  tre- 
mendous strain  under  which,  in  war,  all  commanders 
reach  their  decisions ;  whether  on  the  firing  line  un- 
der a  decimating  hostile  fire,  or  miles  to  the  rear  in 
some  splendidly  equipped  great  general  headquar- 
ters— a  strain  which  confuses  and  deadens  the  or- 
dinary mind  and  character,  but  which  with  those 
few  minds  of  the  very  highest  order,  seems  simply  to 
clarify  and  stimulate  their  workings.  Notwithstand- 
ing this  wartime  stimulation,  the  military  genius  has 
always,  in  peace,  been  a  great  student  and  critic  of 
his  predecessors;  and  while  perhaps  in  many  cases 
'  he  has  not  laid  himself  hypothetical  problems  for 
solution,  he  has  nevertheless  persistently  studied 
and  solved  the  actual  problems  which  history  tells 
him  were  presented  to  former  commanders.  How 
very  much  more  does  the  ordinary  mind,  which  is 
crushed  and  stupified  by  the  appalling  circumstances 
of  war,  need  all  the  guides,  landmarks,  and  resources 
of  applied,  and  long  continued  peace  training,  along 
lines  and  through  incidents  which,  at  least,  are  simi- 
lar to  those  it  is  then  encountering. 

Moltke,  in  "Reflections  on  Strategy  and  Tactics." 

says: 

"It  is  in  the  midst  of  privations  and  sufferings 
of  all  kinds,  when  the  body  is  subjected  to  violent 
fatigue  and  the  mind  to  exceptional  excitement,  that 


—9— 

one  must  make  decisions  the  most  pregnant  with  con- 
sequences, and  communicate  them  in  a  clear  and 
complete  manner.  A  thorough  knowledge  of  theory 
will,  however,  help  lighten  the  practical  working 
out  under  the  difficult  circumstances  of  actual  con- 
ditions in  the  field." 

As  with  the  strain,  so  it  is  in  other  respects 
with  much  of  the  realism  of  war ;  it  cannot  be  very 
closely  simulated.  Actual  work  on  the  ground  with 
troops  in  maneuver  furnishes  us  the  nearest  ap- 
proach thereto.  Next  in  realism,  come  those  ex- 
ercises in  the  form  of  tactical  rides  or  terrain  ex- 
ercises where  the  actual  ground  is  used,  but  the 
troops  are  imaginary.  But  in  tactical  rides  and  ter- 
rain exercises  of  all  sorts,  much  time  is  lost  by  the 
necessity  for  moving  from  point  to  point.  In  actual 
maneuvers,  time  is  again  lost,  and  the  labor  per- 
formed by  the  troops  is,  in  the  aggregate,  very  great. 
Much  of  the  work,  moreover,  particularly  of  the 
higher  commanders  in  the  solution  of  their  problems, 
is  in  no  wise  affected  by  the  presence  or  absence  of 
troops,  or  even  by  being  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
terrain  where  the  problem  is  laid.  In  all  large  move- 
ments, movements  in  which  more  than  a  division  is 
concerned,  the  problem  frequently  is  solved  at  a  com- 
fortable headquarters  and  on  the  map.  And  many 
of  the  problems  of  much  smaller  bodies  will,  even 
in  war,  be  solved  on  the  map  without  reference  to 
the  terrain,  other  than  as  there  shown.  Consequent- 
ly, when  from  the  map  and  in  peace  time  we  state  a 
situation  and  arrive  at  a  decision  upon  the  questions 
involved,  the  departure  from  the  actualities  of  war 
is  not  so  great  as  to  detract  too  much  from  the  value 
of  the  training  so  acquired. 

Moreover,  by  first  solving  problems  on  the  map 
during  the  portion  of  the  year  when  maneuvering 


—10— 

is  difficult,  proceeding  then  to  exercises  on  the 
ground  in  which  only  officers  take  part,  we  finally 
arrive  at  the  maneuver  ground  with  the  corps  of 
officers  already  pretty  well  trained;  and  with  the 
necessity  only  of  completing  their  education  by  cor- 
recting the  probable  inconsistencies  that  have  crept 
in  through  the  mistakes  of  the  imagination,  and  of 
the  many  unexpected  difficulties  developed  by  actual 
handling  of  human  beings  instead  of  the  iron  war- 
game  soldier  of  the  map  room.  In  this  way  we  ob- 
tain a  maximum  of  training  with  a  minimum  of  ef- 
fort, at  least  so  far  as  the  private  soldier  is  con- 
cerned; for  to  maneuver  throughout  the  year,  and 
get  all  of  the  training  of  our  officers  by  field  work 
alone  is  impracticable.  Field  work  to  be  of  value 
must  imitate  the  characteristics  of  war,  which  call 
upon  the  individual  for  the  most  extraordinary  phy- 
sical and  mental  exertions.  Such  periods  in  time  of 
peace  cannot  be  long  continued  if  well  done,  and  if 
not  well  done  they  do  more  actual  harm  than  good. 

The  tactical  problems  with  which  we  are  most 
concerned  at  this  School  are  not  solved  with  troops. 
Formerly,  towards  the  end  of  the  Line  Class  course, 
numerous  maneuvers  were  held  in  which  the  mem- 
bers of  the  class  commanded  troops,  and  were  for 
some  years  graded  upon  this  work  therewith.  But 
with  the  departure  of  about  all  the  troops  from  the 
post,  such  maneuvers  necessarily  ceased  to  be  part 
of  the  course.  Our  problems  are  now  presented  to 
the  student  as  map  problems,  as  incidents  of  the  war 
game  or  map  maneuver,  and  on  the  ground,  as  ter- 
rain exercises  or  as  tactical  rides. 

The  map  problems  are  solved  in  the  map  room 
from  8  to  12,  or  1  to  5.  One  of  the  first  criticisms 
usually  made  is  of  the  allowance  of  4  hours  for  the 
solution  of  the  problem  which  in  the  field  perhaps 


—11— 

would  necessitate  a  decision  within  as  many  minutes. 
Of  course,  a  partial  answer  is  that  in  the  field  the 
trained  commander  is  constantly  thinking  of  his 
situation  and  of  its  possibilities,  so  that  when  some 
change  comes  therein,  it  is  usually  not  entirely  un- 
expected; and  while  immediate  decision  must  be 
made,  the  action  taken  is  the  result  not  simply  of 
3  or  4  minutes  of  thought,  or  even  of  3  or  4  hours, 
but,  perhaps  of  as  many  days.  In  the  field  one  is 
not  presented  suddenly  with  a  situation  new  in 
every  particular;  there  is  at  least  some  knowledge 
of  the  previous  events  of  the  war.  But  in  the  map 
room,  on  the  other  hand,  an  hour  or  more  of  the 
time  allotted  may  be  required  to  get  the  situation 
thoroughly  in  mind.  Then,  again,  in  the  field,  time 
is  not  expended  in  reducing  one's  reasons  and  argu- 
ments to  writing.  An  exception  to  this  rule  of  course 
exists  in  the  case  of  a  chief  of  staff,  who  frequently 
will  be  required  to  submit  to  his  chief  a  written 
estimate  or  appreciation  of  the  situation. 

Our  map  problems  are  of  two  kinds,  according 
to  their  purpose.  In  the  first,  and  by  far  the  most 
numerous  class,  the  problem  ordinarily  consists  of  a 
single  situation  with  requirements  which  call  for  an 
estimate  of  the  situation  and  for  the  necessary  or- 
ders. The  situation  presented  is  one  in  which  the 
commander  is  on  a  mission  more  or  less  detached, 
and  where  therefore  the  decision  must  largely  be  an 
independent  one.  The  great  purpose  of  such  prob- 
lems is  the  cultivation  of  sureness  and  certainty  in 
the  application  of  tactical  principles  to  concrete 
cases,  and  the  acquirement  of  independence  in  tac- 
tical judgment  and  in  character.  In  such  problems, 
but  strictly  subordinate  to  the  main  purpose,  the 
acquirement  of  technical  skill  in  the  writing  of 
suitable  orders  to  carry  a  decision  into  effect  is  the 


—12— 

aim.  In  the  second  class,  called  troop  leading,  the 
cultivation  of  independence  in  judgment  is  subordi- 
nated to  the  acquisition  of  technical  skill  in  writing 
orders.  When  troops  are  handled  in  masses,  the 
initiative  and  independence  of  subordinates,  while 
of  course  still  constantly  cultivated,  are  nevertheless 
necessarily  restricted  within  rather  narrow  limits. 
The  subordinate  commander's  chief  duty,  therefore, 
then  becomes  not  the  making  of  decisions  of  con- 
siderable tactical  importance,  but,  while  making  his 
circumscribed  and  minor  decisions  based  upon  the 
orders  of  his  superiors,  the  carrying  out  of  the  whole 
into  effect,  with  excellent  technique  for  the  produc- 
tion of  a  high  average  of  teamwork. 

Even  minor  decisions,  are  not  easily  reached 
until  there  has  been  a  considerable  development  of 
decision  and  character  by  the  solution  of  a  number 
of  purely  independent  tactical  problems.  For  that 
reason,  the  early  part  of  the  course  is  devoted  chiefly 
to  problems  in  which  an  independent  decision  is  re- 
quired, while  the  purely  troop  leading  problems,  in 
which  technique  is  emphasized,  are  reserved  for  the 
later  portions  of  the  indoor  season. 

The  war  game,  with  its  constantly  changing 
situations,  each  demanding  decision  upon  the  ques- 
tions involved,  is  largely  relied  upon  for  the  cultiva- 
tion of  troop  leading  ability.  In  addition  thereto, 
in  most  terrain  exercises  and  tactical  rides,  the  troop 
leading  feature  is  predominant;  and  then  we  find 
certain  troop  leading  problems  when  the  course  is 
well  under  way.  This  year  there  has  also  been 
added  for  the  Special  Class,  a  series  of  exercises  in 
the  issuing  of  verbal  and  dictated  orders. 

In  terrain  exercises  and  tactical  rides  the 
ground  replaces  the  map.  At  this  school,  the  term 
"terrain  exercise"  has  come  to  mean  simply  an  exer- 


—13— 

cise  on  the  ground  in  which  the  students  write  the 
answers  and  are  graded  thereon. 

In  the  solution  of  any  problem,  in  the  arrival  at 
any  tactical  decision  and  prior  to  the  issue  of  any 
tactical  orders,  there  must  be  an  estimate  of  the  situa- 
tion, unless  the  reason  is  not  to  enter  at  all  into  the 
action  taken.  This  estimate  of  the  situation  may 
be  exceedingly  brief,  and  the  result  of  only  a  few 
conscious  thoughts;  or  it  may  be  lengthy,  involved, 
and  in  every  way  an  elaborate  discussion  of  a  wide 
range  of  factors.  The  first  will  be  the  action  of 
some  subordinate  commander,  a  captain  for  exam- 
ple, in  a  rather  routine  obedience  on  the  spot  to  the 
order  of  an  immediate  superior.  The  latter  will  be 
found  in  the  memorandum  submitted  to  the  supreme 
command  by  some  chief  of  a  great  general  staff. 
Except  in  the  extremely  simple  case,  the  estimate  of 
the  situation  will  almost  invariably  contain  some  con- 
sideration of  the  commander's  mission,  of  his  enemy, 
of  his  own  troops  and  the  friendly  troops  about  him, 
of  possible  plans  of  action,  and  will  conclude  with  a 
decision  to  govern  his  action.  Therefore,  in  the 
Service  Schools,  while  great  latitude  is  allowed  with- 
in this  framework,  yet  it  is  expected  that  the  head- 
ings given  will  not  be  departed  from  except  for 
cause,  the  burden  of  proof  for  the  logic  of  the  depar- 
ture resting  upon  the  solver. 

Much  importance  is  given  to  a  definite  statement 
of  the  mission  because,  unless  one  knows  exactly 
what  his  job  is,  can  make  a  definite  statement  there- 
of, and  keeps  this  prime  duty  constantly  in  mind, 
he  is  not  likely  to  go  far  towards  a  correct  solution. 
Sometimes,  while  your  original  mission  was  clearly 
defined  by  orders,  for  example,  of  higher  authority, 
information  received  later  indicates  a  radically  dif- 
ferent situation  from  that  upon  which  your  instruc- 


—14— 

tions  had  been  based.  Until  you  have  carefully  re- 
viewed all  of  the  circumstances,  it  may  be  impos- 
sible to  tell  what  your  mission  has  now  become.  If  a 
written  estimate  is  required,  and  you  are  in  doubt, 
state  your  original  mission  at  the  head  of  your  paper, 
and  the  fact  that  further  consideration  must  follow 
before  you  can  determine  whether  or  not  there  has 
been  any  change  in  that  mission.  But  somewhere, 
at  the  logical  point  where  the  new  mission  has  been 
ascertained,  make  a  definite,  concise  statement  of 
what  you  now  consider  it  to  be. 

In  logical  consideration  of  the  governing  fac- 
tors, a  statement  of  the  mission  must  usually  be 
followed  by  a  more  or  less  detailed  study  of  the 
enemy's  circumstances.  The  information  concern- 
ing him,  where  real  problems  in  the  field  have  to  be 
solved,  comes  in  from  a  great  number  of  sources. 
Such  reports  are  frequently  in  conflict  with  each 
other.  Digesting  this  mass,  rejecting  the  improb- 
able, and  deducing  from  the  whole  a  certain  hostile 
situation  as  the  most  likely,  is,  in  every  headquarters 
from  a  division  up,  assigned  to  a  section  of  the  gen- 
eral staff  therewith,  and  constitutes  a  very  nice  and 
very  difficult  portion  of  the  general  estimate  of  a 
situation.  Such  a  digest  of  the  information,  and 
opinion  as  to  the  enemy's  strength,  position,  and  in- 
tentions will  usually  be  presented  by  this  section  of 
the  general  staff  to  the  chief  of  staff,  with  brief 
reasons  for  the  deductions  thereof;  and  upon  the 
situation  so  taken  as  the  most  probable  the  plan  of 
action  will  be  based.  It  is  something  like  this  digest 
of  enemy  information  which  is  ordinarily  presented 
to  a  student  in  the  map  room ;  for  it  is  evident  that  to 
place  in  the  statement  of  a  situation  the  mass  of  re- 
ports upon  which  the  action  of  large  bodies  is  cus- 
tomarily based,  is  prohibited  by  the  time  available 


—15— 

for  the  solution.  In  the  statement  of  problems  ex- 
pressions like,  "It  is  reliably  reported,"  or  "General 
A  learns/'  the  information  so  conveyed  can  be  as- 
sumed to  be  correct.  To  quote  Moltke  again : 

"It  is  necessary  to  examine  attentively  the  con- 
tents as  well  as  the  form  of  each  message  to  distm- 
guish  clearly  that  which  is  certain  from  that  which 
is  probable  or  merely  possible.  Apprehension  and 
personal  illustrations  should  be  allowed  no  influence 
on  the  estimate  of  the  situation;  a  trained  critical 
sense  is  needed  to  distinguish  the  essential  from  the 
non-essential.  It  can  scarcely  appear  of  conse- 
quence to  the  subordinate  to  report  that  his  post  has 
been  undisturbed  during  a  certain  period,  yet  this 
circumstance  may  be  of  greatest  importance  to  the 
commander  of  the  whole.  At  the .  conclusion  of  a 
battle  it  is  usually  of  the  highest  importance  for  the 
higher  commander  to  know  as  soon  as  possible  what 
organizations  of  the  enemy,  what  regiments  and 
corps  have  been  engaged  and  what  is  the  enemy's 
present  condition." 

The  strength  of  the  enemy  in  opposition  to  the 
force  dealt  with,  is  frequently  an  important  item  for 
determination.  Where  the  mission  of  the  detach- 
ment is  to  hold  an  enemy  body  in  check,  if  that  hos- 
tile body  is  much  inferior  in  strength,  that  mission 
might  sometimes  best  be  accomplished  by  an  active 
offensive.  If  the  hostile  body  is,  on  the  other  hand, 
greatly  superior,  such  assumption  of  the  offensive 
might  be  suicidal.  This  statement,  however,  should 
not  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  an  attack  will  never 
be  made  against  superior  forces.  For  instance,  if 
a  brigade  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  corps  learns 
that  that  corps  is  withdrawing,  the  brigade  may  be 
justified  in  vigorously  attacking  to  hold  it  in  place 
until  other  friendly  troops  come  up.  Or,  a  flanking 
detachment  may  find  it  necessary  to  attack  a  much 
superior  force  to  draw  that  superior  force  upon 


—16— 

itself  and  prevent  its  engaging  at  some  crucial  mo- 
ment in  the  main  fight.  The  enemy's  strength  may 
also  be  a  vitally  important  element  of  the  estimate 
in  other  ways.  For  example,  a  force  sent  to  capture 
some  point  believed  to  be  lightly  guarded,  would  or- 
dinarily not  be  expected  to  attack  if  later  informa- 
tion makes  certain  that  the  enemy  has  in  position 
three  or  four  times  its  numbers. 

Like  the  enemy's  probable  strength,  an  idea  of 
his  mission  and  the  manner  in  which  he  will  go  about 
carrying  it  out,  must  be  obtained  or  deduced  from 
the  circumstances  of  the  problem,  in  order  to  have 
a  proper  basis  for  our  own  plan  of  action.  Try  to 
get  at  the  enemy's  problem  and  solve  it  from  his 
point  of  view.  Usually,  with  no  direct  indication  of 
the  hostile  intentions  further  than  an  idea  of  his 
mission,  we  assume  that  he  will  act  with  good  judg- 
ment, and  we  therefore  base  our  plans  primarily 
upon  the  assumption  that  the  enemy  will  take  that 
action  which  will  cause  us  the  greatest  difficulty  in 
counteracting.  In  doing  this,  of  course  we  do  not 
simply  neglect  the  possibility  of  other  action  upon 
his  part,  but  must  make  such  provision  to  learn  of 
other  action  in  time  to  take  proper  steps  for  meeting 
it.  The  unexpected  is  the  rule  in  war,  and  our  idea 
of  good  judgment  is  probably  very  different  from 
that  of  the  enemy.  Moltke  says : 

"In  reality  no  one  conducts  a  fight  without  a 
definite  purpose.  Generally  in  doubtful  cases  and 
when  the  conditions  are  not  clear,  as  so  often  hap- 
pens in  war,  it  is  better  to  be  enterprising  and  pre- 
serve the  initiative  than  to  wait  for  the  lead  of  the 
enemy.  The  latter  often  sees  as  little  into  our  situa- 
tion and  will  often  give  up  the  game,  although  the 
real  situation  in  no  wise  demands  it." 

Our  own  forces  and  the  probability  of  timely 


—17— 

aid  by  friendly  troops  or  otherwise,  may  have  a 
decisive  effect  upon  the  required  action.  If,  for 
example  again,  we  are  to  receive  strong  support 
from  other  troops  within  sufficient  time,  we  may  be 
justified  in  defending  a  position  in  the  face  of  great- 
ly superior  strength,  when  otherwise  we  would  have 
no  choice  but  to  run  and  to  run  hard. 

Not  only  does  the  question  of  relative  numbers 
require  careful  consideration  but  that  of  relative 
morale  as  well.  If  our  enemy  consists  of  militia,  or 
his  men  are  three-quarters  recruits,  or  he  has  al- 
ready been  beaten  by  us,  we  may  venture  many 
things  that  would  not  under  other  circumstances  be 
warranted. 

The  terrain  usually,  but  not  always,  must  be 
thought  of.  In  an  attack,  and  even  more  in  a  de- 
fense, the  proper  dispositions  are  very  largely  de- 
pendent upon  local  cover.  In  an  outpost,  the  net- 
work of  roads  determines  the  framework.  In  a 
march,  there  are  usually  several  routes  among  which 
a  selection  has  to  be  made. 

When  one  comes  to  the  practicable  plans  of 
action,  no  time  should  be  wasted  on  the  unthinkable 
or  unreasonable.  For  instance,  I  have  seen  solutions 
of  an  advance  guard  problem,  where  the  commander 
had  been  ordered  to  march  at  a  certain  hour  by  a 
certain  route,  in  which  the  student  gravely  and  at 
length  considered  whether  he  should  advance,  re- 
treat, take  up  a  defensive  position,  or  a  position  in 
readiness,  or  should  attack.  Naturally,  under  his 
definite  orders  for  very  circumscribed  movements, 
the  only  plans  of  action  for  his  consideration  were  as 
to  the  division  and  distribution  of  his  forces.  All  of 
the  rest  not  only  constituted  a  waste  of  time  but 
weakened  his  solution  by  its  mechanical  folly. 

No  help  can  be  given  by  this  talk  towards  the 


—18-- 

selection  of  the  proper  plan  of  action.  That  must 
be  arrived  at  by  a  nice  weighing  of  the  advantages 
and  disadvantages  of  each  possible  course,  as  ga- 
thered from  the  teachings  of  history  and  epitomized 
in  the  Field  Service  Regulations  and  the  other  text 
books  that  are  being  studied.  Whatever  course  is 
decided  upon,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  key- 
note of  all  sane  tactical  procedure  must  always  be 
simplicity.  Nothing  complicated,  or  in  which  action 
is  built  upon  condition,  has  a  reasonable  prospect  of 
accomplishment  among  all  the  uncertainties  of  war. 
The  sane,  reasonable  procedure  is  the  one  that  wins 
here  in  this  School  as  it  does  in  the  real  matters  of 
war.  This  does  not  mean  that  risks  must  not  be 
taken,  or  even  at  times  the  desperate  chance;  but 
the  chance  should  be  such  as  is  logically  required  by 
the  situation,  and  not  simply  interjected  to  make 
the  unusual  or  brilliant  solution.  Contrary  to  the 
belief  in  many  quarters,  the  Napoleonic  solution  is 
not  manifested  by  its  complexity,  but  in  fact  is  mani- 
fested by  its  simplicity.  The  genius  of  the  greatest 
tactical  master  of  all  time  is  found  in  his  extraor- 
dinary ability  to  reduce  the  complex  to  the  simple, 
and  to  find  therein  the  basic  idea  that  best  promised 
success. 

Map  problems  at  this  School  are  written  to 
illustrate  some  one  or  tw6  simple  principles  which 
have  riot  only  been  previously  studied  in  the  text, 
but  which  the  instructor  has  usually  laid  particular 
stress  upon  in  conference.  If  the  conference  has 
been  carefully  followed,  there  should  ordinarily  be 
no  great  difficulty  in  recognizing  the  principles  in- 
volved in  the  proper  solution  of  the  problem.  If 
the  instructor  notes  a  lack  of  attention  in  conference, 
he  is  very  liable  to  build  a  problem  about  the  points 
he  thinks  have  been  missed,  as  the  best  means  of 


causing  them  to  be  remembered. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  frequently  not  the 
principle,  but  its  exception,  or  opposite,  will  be  illus- 
trated. Some  years  ago,  this  department  perhaps 
laid  greater  stress  upon  the  evils  of  dispersion  than 
it  does  even  today.  The  writer,  listening  to  its 
teachings,  determined  never  to  disperse.  But  he 
had  overlooked  the  fact  that  dispersion  is  sometimes 
necessary  and  proper.  A  terrain  exercise  came 
along  involving  a  delaying  action  by  a  rear  guard. 
Remembering  his  determination  never  to  disperse, 
the  student  tied  his  battalion  up  in  a  little  knot  on 
Reservoir  Hill,  on  this  reservation,  passed  which  the 
enemy  could  quickly  force  his  way.  The  answer, 
though,  in  this  case  was  dispersion ;  but  the  student 
had  made  for  himself  and  had  acted  upon  an  inflex- 
ible rule,  with  the  result  that  when  his  mark  for 
that  exercise  was  published  he  was  found  leading 
the  class  in  the  reverse  direction. 

Particularly  in  troop  leading  problems  and  ter- 
rain exercises,  the  solution  required  is  of  the  simplest 
character.  And  when  extremely  simple  action  seems 
called  for,  the  student  should  not  hesitate  to  take  that 
and  no  more.  I  remember  one  situation  in  an  old 
terrain  exercise  in  which  the  commander  of  the 
whole,  riding  with  his  main  body,  suddenly  hears 
heavy  firing  in  the  direction  of  the  advance  guard. 
His  action  was  called  for.  The  approved  solution 
had  him  "join  the  advance  guard ;"  but  most  students 
proceeded  to  put  their  divisions  through  complicated 
maneuvers.  The  writer  again  in  one  of  his  earlier 
terrain  exercises  suffered  from  a  similar  mistake. 
He  received  a  situation  which  seemed  to  call  for 
nothing  except  to  run,  and  at  once;  but  he  said  to 
himself:  "An  instructor  has  spent  a  whole  lot  of 
time  getting  up  this  beautiful  situation  and  in  bring- 


—20— 

ing  out  all  these  officers  to  solve  it.  If  I  simply 
say  that  my  command  faces  to  the  rear  and  runs,  it 
will  not  be  showing  proper  respect  for  the  Institution 
and  for  the  author  of  the  problem."  So,  the  student 
proceeded  to  issue  voluminous  orders  for  a  retreat, 
and  to  show  his  respect  for  the  problem  by  scattering 
his  troops  all  over  the  reservation.  But  the  approv- 
ed solution  was :  "Squads  right  about,  March ;"  and 
once  again  the  writer,  when  the  marks  were  publish- 
ed, was  crowding  the  leaders  to  the  rear. 

The  estimate  of  the  situation  must  close  with  a 
definite  and  concisely  stated  decision  upon  the  im- 
portant points  involved.  If  the  whole  point  to  the 
problem  is  whether  to  attack  or  defend  and  the  de- 
cision is  to  attack,  it  may  be  sufficiently  expressed  by 
the  statement:  "To  attack,  enveloping  the  hostile 
right."  If  in  another  problem  the  matter  of  attacking 
is  not  so  much  in  question  as  the  manner  of  doing 
it,  then  the  decision  must  have  more  elaborate  ex- 
pression and  contain  the  adopted  disposition  of 
troops.  The  decision  should  in  general  be  as  brief 
as  possible  and  be  an  answer  to  the  important  ques- 
tions raised  by  the  statement  of  the  problem. 

The  best  estimate  of  the  situation  is  one  which 
proceeds  to  a  logical  consideration  of  the  factors  that 
go  to  determine  decision,  taking  each  in  its  proper 
turn  and  giving  each  the  exact  amount  of  considera- 
tion due  its  relative  value.  A  good  estimate  does  not 
have  to  be  of  great  length;  in  fact,  the  more  con- 
cisely expressed,  providing  nothing  essential  is  omit- 
ted, the  better.  For  the  simple  situation,  the  esti- 
mate may  be  very  short  indeed.  In  no  case  should 
there  be  deliberate  padding  to  produce  length;  and 
yet  such  solutions  are  frequently  submitted.  Very 
often  papers  appear  which  contain  page  after  page 
of  quotation,  from  the  Field  Service  Regulations  for 


—21— 

instance,  to  the  great  waste  of  valuable  time  for  both 
student  and  instructor,  unless  the  latter  saves  him- 
self by  carefully  skipping  the  passages  containing 
such.  The  estimate  should  be  a  systematic  search 
for  a  solution  that  promises  success. 

Admiral  Fiske,  writing  in  the  January  (1916) 
NORTH  AMERICAN  REVIEW  upon  the  Naval  Policy  of 
the  United  States,  gives  the  following  very  clear  de- 
scription of  the  Estimate  of  the  Situation : 

"In  the  'Estimate  of  the  Situation'  method,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  orator  has  no  opportunity,  be- 
cause the  procedure  is  simply  an  accurate  process 
of  reasoning.  It  is  divided  into  four  parts.  The 
first  part  consists  of  a  careful  study  of  the  'mission', 
ending  in  a  clear  determination  of  what  that  'mis- 
sion' really  is — that  is :  what  is  the  thing  which  it  is 
desired  to  do  ?  The  second  part  consists  of  a  careful 
study,  and  eventually  a  clear  comprehension  of  the 
difficulties  in  the  way;  the  third  part  consists  of  a 
careful  study,  and  eventually  a  clear  comprehension, 
of  what  facilities  are  available  with  which  to  over- 
come the  difficulties;  the  fourth  part  consists  of  a 
careful  study  of  the  mission,  difficulties  and  facili- 
ties, in  their  mutual  relations,  and  a  'decision'  as  to 
what  should  therefore  be  done." 

The  actual  procedure  in  solving  any  tactical 
problem,  whether  in  the  map  room  or  in  the  field, 
is  so  entirely  an  individual  matter  and  so  absolutely 
dependent  upon  the  characteristics,  temperament, 
and  equation  of  the  one  solving,  that  any  word  to  as- 
sist is  difficult  to  give.  Each  one  must  decide  for 
himself  how  best  to  do  his  tactical  work  in  the  map 
room,  in  accordance  with  his  own  habits  and  manner 
of  performance.  But,  while  fitting  his  routine  to 
his  own  equation,  he  can,  nevertheless,  learn  some- 
thing from  what  others  have  found  advisable. 

It  is  important  to  remember  that  the  time  al- 
lotted for  the  solution  should  consist  of  4  hours' 


—22— 

downright,  hard,  concentrated  and  systematic  work. 
There  should  be  no  periods  of  just  sitting  and  hoping 
that  a  stroke  of  genius  will  arrive  to  make  the  proper 
answer  evident.  The  only  way  to  get  that  stroke 
is  to  dig  for  it.  Moreover,  I  believe  it  is  worth  re- 
peating that  the  digging  must  be  systematic. 

In  the  first  place,  the  student  must  find  out  what 
the  problem  is.  There  must  be  a  thorough  realiza- 
tion not  only  of  the  bald  outline  furnished  by  the 
statement  of  the  problem,  but  of  all  the  attendant 
circumstances  that  can  only  be  guessed  at.  The 
student's  imagination  must  be  stimulated  to  the 
extent  that  he  can  realize  many  hopes  and  fears  that 
are  tugging  at  the  commander  who  has  to  make  the 
actual  decision  in  the  field.  He  must  become  thor- 
oughly imbued  with  the  realities  of  the  imaginary 
situation  if  he  is  to  arrive  at  a  suitable  solution.  To 
work  himself  so  thoroughly  into  the  situation  takes 
time  and  concentration. 

The  statement  of  the  problem  should  first  be 
read  over  carefully,  perhaps  underlining  in  red 
those  parts  that  refer  to  Reds;  ai}d  in  blue,  those 
referring  to  the  Blues;  and  the  places  mentioned 
should  be  staked  out  on  the  map  or  maps.  Usually 
two  or  three  maps  are  necessary  to  get  the  entire 
scene,  probably  the  guide  map,  scale  about  10  miles 
to  the  inch,  for  the  general  outlines;  then  possibly 
some  outlying  points  are  to  be  found  on  the  one-inch 
map ;  and  finally  the  tactical  locations  on  the  three- 
inch  map,  on  which  all  but  the  division  problems  are 
habitually  laid.  Then  the  problem  must  be  read 
again  and  again  until  certain  that  all  points  have 
been  correctly  located,  and  that  the  student  has 
worked  himself  completely  into  the  atmosphere  of 
his  drama.  It  would  seem  unnecessary  to  caution  so 
carefully  that  one  must  know  what  his  task  is  be- 


—23— 

fore  he  starts  to  perform  it.  But  it  is  a  fact,  that 
student  officers  are  constantly  solving,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  some  other  than  the  problem  laid  down.  Deal- 
ing with  one  division,  another  which  is  only  casually 
mentioned  in  the  statement  of  the  problem,  is  put 
into  camp.  Or,  having  the  problem  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  commander,  the  whole  division  is 
considered.  Or,  the  scene  being  laid  on  one  section 
of  the  map,  similar  numbers  somewhere  else  are 
taken,  and  the  given  directions  and  distances  from 
landmarks  are  overlooked.  Such  mistakes  usually 
occur  from  an  undue  impatience  to  get  to  work ;  for- 
getting that  a  very  reasonable  allowance  must  be 
made  to  accquire  a  definite  understanding  of  the 
problem,  or  risk  wasting  much  work  and  time  be- 
cause of  failure  therein.  Read  the  requirements 
with  care.  You  may  or  may  not  be  called  upon  for 
an  estimate  of  the  situation.  Do  not  write  one  un- 
less it  is  required. 

As  soon  as  the  problem  is  thoroughly  under- 
stood, the  whole  estimate  of  the  situation,  if  one  is 
required,  should  be  blocked  out.  That  is,  a  rough 
penciled  framework  should  be  constructed  of  the 
items  for  consideration,  and  a  rough  allotment  of 
the  time  remaining  should  be  made.  For  instance, 
where  the  staking  out  and  careful  reading  of  the  , 
problem  has  taken  a  half  an  hour,  and  the  estimate 
promises  to  require  considerable  writing,  but  the  or- 
ders on  the  other  hand  seem  likely  to  be  short,  the 
time  might  be  allotted  as  follows:  2£  hours  to  the 
estimate,  one-half  hour  to  the  orders,  and  the  remain- 
ing half  hour  to  a  checking  up  of  the  whole  solution 
in  order  to  see  that  no  serious  error  has  crept  in. 
And  when  this  schedule,  which  of  course  is  different 
for  each  new  problem,  is  made  up,  it  should  be  ad- 
hered to.  There  are  always  some  officers  who  are 


—24— 

surprised  by  the  passage  of  time  and  do  not  finish 
their  solutions.  The  failure  is  usually  due  to  the 
lack  of  such  a  schedule.  It  is  believed  that  almost 
anyone  can  profitably  systematize  his  work  in  this 
manner. 

Of  course,  while  considering  one  idea  others  are 
flashing  through  the  mind.  If  the  general  scheme 
of  the  estimate  has  been  blocked  out  in  the  manner 
suggested,  it  is  sufficient  to  note  in  that  scheme  the 
new  idea  where  its  importance  seems  to  give  it  place, 
for  due  consideration  later  in  its  proper  turn.  The 
discussion  of  each  proposition  must  be  completed 
before  turning  to  another,  if  progress  is  to  be  made 
and  the  finished  solution  is  to  have  a  logical  ar- 
rangement. 

The  amount  of  time  and  space  devoted  to  the 
discussion  of  any  factor  should  be  in  accordance 
with  its  relative  importance.  Very  detailed  and 
lengthy  consideration  is  frequently  given  some  route, 
which,  for  obvious  reasons,  from  the  beginning  had 
little  chance  of  being  selected;  while  the  important 
matter  upon  which  everything  else  depended,  wheth- 
er to  fight  or  run,  was  settled  in  a  few  words,  and 
so  far  as  the  solution  indicated,  by  a  mere  guess. 
Keep  matters  in  due  proportion.  If  the  decision  of 
prime  importance  is  whether  to  fight  or  to  withdraw, 
as  a  rule,  logically,  that  point  should  be  settled  be- 
fore considering  how  to  fight ;  if  the  next  step  in  im- 
portance is  whether  to  attack  or  defend,  take  that 
matter  up  and  reach  a  decision  thereupon,  before 
considering  the  manner  of  attacking.  Otherwise  the 
estimate  will  contain  much  that  is  irrevelant  or  dis- 
proportionate, and  therefore  will  not  have  two  es- 
sential qualities  of  a  good  estimate :  a  logical  arrange- 
ment of  topics  and  a  properly  balanced  discussion. 

Now  your  idea  of  balance  and  due  proportion  in 


—25— 

this  matter  of  an  estimate,  like  any  other  question 
of  judgment,  may  be  very  different  from  that  of  the 
instructor.  But  if,  in  your  opinion,  one  possible 
course  of  action  is  of  so  little  relative  importance 
that  it  should  be  dismissed  with  a  written  line,  yet 
you  are  inclined  to  write  more  because  the  instructor 
may  possibly  want  an  exhaustive  treatment,  I  ad- 
vise that  you  conform  to  the  dictates  of  your  own 
best  judgment.  In  the  long  run,  courage  in  the 
map  room  has  its  reward  just  as  surely  as  it  does 
anywhere  else. 

Many  and  many  a  solution  is  spoiled  because 
the  student  does  not  review  his  own  paper  before 
turning  it  in.  He  may  forget  brigades  in  his  order, 
or  lose  pages  of  his  manuscript,  or  commit  some 
other  glaring  error  which  would  almost  certainly  be 
detected  if  he  reserved  time  for  re-reading. 

Be  extremely  careful  that  the  order  agrees  with 
the  decision.  If  the  decision  is  to  attack,  enveloping 
the  hostile  right,  and  then  the  order  provides  for  an 
envelopment  of  the  left,  the  assumption  will  probably 
be  made  in  reviewing  that  no  real  decision  had  been 
reached,  that  the  student  has  been  guilty  of  indeci- 
sion. And  again,  be  sure  that  whatever  you  decide 
to  do,  is  done  with  all  available  forces.  If  you  are 
going  to  attack,  take  no  half-hearted  measures,  but 
attack  with  vigor,  and  so  long  as  there  is  a  prospect 
of  victory  do  hot  hesitate  to  put  in  all  your  reserves. 
Do  not  hedge.  Indecision  and  half  measures  are 
most  serious  tactical  errors,  which  in  war  or  in  the 
map  room  usually  bring  prompt  retribution. 

Quoting  again  from  Buddecke  : 

The  Psychological  Process  in  Solving  a 
Tactical   Problem 

"After  we  have  gained  a  correct  insight  into 
the  details  of  the  problem,  we  get  to  the  main  task, 


—26— 

which  is,  to  think  ourselves  completely  into  the 
spirit  of  the  problem  and  to  arrive  at  an  estimate 
and  decision  for  our  future  course. 

"By  repeatedly  and  quietly  reading  the  problem, 
paying  due  regard  to  the  map  in  front  of  us,  we  gain, 
just  as  in  focusing  a  telescope,  a  clearer  and  clearer 
conception  of  the  situation.  The  more  we  succeed 
in  placing  ourselves  mentally  in  the  given  situation 
and  in  recognizing  all  the  details  in  their  relation 
to  the  general  problem,  the  more  we  succeed  in 
thinking  ourselves  into  the  soul  of  the  leader,  in  con- 
ceiving the  magnitude  of  his  task,  and  in  sharing 
his  responsibility,  the  more  eager  we  shall  become 
to  take  over  his  duties  and  play  an  active  part  in 
the  operations. 

The  longer  we  "brood"  over  the  map,  the  clearer 
will  be  our  conception  of  the  measures  which  the 
situation  demands.  And  in  this  it  is  important  to 
hold  and  consider  carefully ;  that  is,  to  follow  out,  to 
their  furthest  effects,  all  the  thoughts  and  ideas 
which  come  to  us,  often  passing  like  lightning 
through  our  brains  and  suggesting  various  lines  of 
action.  Often  it  is  precisely  these  fleeting  thoughts 
which  lead  us  to  the  right  path.  But  ideas  which 
are  not  fully  thought  out  and  thoroughly  weighed 
can  not  have  a  decisive  influence  on  our  judgment 
and  decision.  A  head  which  has  a  hundred  thoughts, 
but  which  can  neither  hold  fast  nor  think  out  a  sin- 
gle one,  will  always  remain  undecided  and  irresolute 
in  tactics. 

"Only  by  intensive  reflection  is  found,  in  the 
confusion,  the  Ariadne  thread  which  will  lead  us 
from  the  maze.  However,  although  attention  to  de- 
tails is  to  be  recommended,  yet  the  larger  points  of 
view  which  we  have  gained  must  not  be  lost  in  the 
consideration  of  minor  details  —  a  mistake  often 
made  and  naturally  often  leading  to  false  conclusions. 
It  is  rather  our  chief  duty  to  find  just  these  main 
points,  and  the  attention  to  minor  details  is  but  a 
means  to  this  end. 

"Character  and  intuition  unconsciously  weave 
their  thread  into  this  labor  of  comprehension.  To 
that  which  our  brain  devises  is  added,  with  good  or 


—27— 

bad  effect,  that  which  our  intuition  presents;  and 
from  the  combined  activity  of  both  come  as  a  pro- 
duct judgment  and  decision. 

"It  is  a  delicate  psychological  process  which 
takes  place  in  the  head  and  breast  of  the  tactician, 
and  without  doubt  this  inner  effort  is  one  of  the  most 
stimulating  and  interesting  of  activities. 

"A  tactical  question  awakens  all  our  spiritual 
and  mental  powers.  It  demands  keenness  and  un- 
derstanding, common  sense  and  imagination,  firm- 
ness and  patience,  caution  and  daring,  sense  of 
locality  and  memory,  judgment  and  power  of  deci- 
sion. The  whole  character,  the  whole  disposition, 
the  whole  individuality  of  a  man  finds  its  expression 
here.  Thus  the  solution  of  a  tactical  problem  re- 
flects the  spirit  of  its  author,  since  it  is  based  on  the 
peculiarities  of  his  own  individual  character.  A 
hesitating  character  will,  in  doubtful  cases,  prefer 
the  defensive  to  the  offensive.  Kindred  natures 
will  follow  similar  trains  of  thought  and  in  the 
majority  of  cases  reach  similar  conclusions. 

Marks  of  Sound  Tactical  Procedure 

"If  the  question  arises,  what  are  the  marks  of 
sound  tactical  procedure?  the  answer  is,  simplicity 
and  firm  adherence  to  a  line  of  action  adopted.  Who- 
ever succeeds  in  finding,  among  the  many  possibili- 
ties which  often  present  themselves,  the  simplest 
and  most  natural  way,  and  in  following  it  out  con- 
sistently, has  gained  the  essentials  of  success.  While 
artificiality  is  dangerous  everywhere  in  the  military 
profession,  in  tactics,  it  is  deadly.  Every  tactical 
procedure  ought  to  be  simple,  clear  and  easily  un- 
derstood, like  a  true  work  of  art,  which  anyone  might 
believe  himself  able  to  imitate.  Here  also  the 
highest  perfection  lies  in  the  greatest  simplicity. 
One  thing  must  be  added,  however,  for  the  carrying 
out  of  tactical  decisions ;  that  is,  firmness.  The  de- 
cision, once  reached,  must  be  unwaveringly  carried 
out  with  our  whole  energy.  This  condition  is  of  so 
great  importance  in  tactical  affairs  that  the  best 
course  of  action,  if  carried  put  half-heartedly,  will 
come  to  naught,  while  a  mistake  in  the  choice  of 


—28— 

courses  can  often  be  entirely  offset  by  decided  and 
confident  action/' 

The  following  is  from  Litzmann,  formerly  Di- 
rector of  the  German  War  Academy,  on  the  Solution 

of  Tactical  Problems: 

• 

"In  considering  problems  especially  intended  to 
promote  the  study  of  the  regulations  and  text  books, 
the  solver  will  have  to  exercise  especially  diligence 
and  care;  while  in  problems  intended  to  cultivate 
the  power  of  decision,  he  will  need  more  the  powers 
of  the  mind  and  intuition.  At  all  times,  however,  he 
will  need  the  power  of  imagination  to  help  him 
'bring  the  situation  vividly  before  his  eyes.  The 
better  he  can  do  this,  the  more  correctly  will  he  act.  * 
*  #  * 

"A  practical  solution  can  nearly  always  be 
found  by  him  who  has  sufficient  talent  and  experience 
to  see  the  map  plastically  before  him,  and  not  only 
to  comprehend  mechanically  the  information  in  the 
problem  concerning  the  strength  of  both  forces,  but 
actually  to  see  the  opposing  parties  with  his  mind's 
eye  and,  as  it  were,  actually  experience  the  events 
portrayed.  *  * 

"The  necessary  basis  for  the  solution  of  prob- 
lems consists  therefore  in  a  eorrect  comprehension 
of  the  map  and  of  the  opposing  forces.  The  map 
lies  before  the  solver;  he  only  needs  to  be  able  to 
read  it ;  this  does  not  mean  merely  that  he  must  be 
able  to  understand  the  meaning  of  all  conventional 
signs  and  to  reckon  distances,  but  also  that  he  must 
be  able  to  comprehend  all  details  so  that  they  form 
themselves  into  a  complete  and  harmonious  whole; 
and  this  to  such  a  degree  that  he  actually  feels  the 
nature  of  the  terrain  in  the  map  before  him. 

"Every  soldier  who  is  at  all  fitted  for  the  duties 
of  leadership  can,  by  practice,  gain  this  ability, 
though  the  time  required  may  be  long  or  short,  ac- 
cording to  the  natural  ability  of  the  worker.  The 
frequent  comparison  of  the  map  with  the  actual 
terrain  conditions  is  particularly  helpful. 

"In  tactical  problems  the  forces  on  both  sides, 


—29— 

are,  as  a  usual  thing,  no  more  clearly  indicated  than 
they  would  be  in  maneuvers  or  actual  warfare.  Of 
course,  one  has  definite  information  concerning  the 
troops  under  his  own  command;  but  this  is  not 
always  the  case  concerning  friendly  sub-divisions, 
and  the  enemy's  forces  are  almost  always  unknown. 
In  this  point  lies  the  'uncertainty  of  war  conditions', 
a  very  necessary  part  of  a  good  tactical  problem. 
Sometimes  only  'symptoms'  are  given  from  which 
conclusions  are  to  be  drawn,  just  as  in  the  case  of 
a  doctor's  diagnosis :  for  instance,  the  sound  of  firing 
from  a  direction  where  there  is  not  supposed  to  be 
any  enemy;  the  sound  of  battle,  suddenly  ceasing, 
although  we  believed  that  we  still  had  at  least  an 
hour  before  our  time  for  taking  part ;  the  conduct 
of  the  inhabitants  from  which  the  nearness  of  hos- 
tile forces  can  often  be  guessed,  etc.  Things  of 
this  sort  are  often  easily  overlooked  in  reading  a 
problem,  even  though  they  be  of  supreme  importance. 
Therefore,  it  is  important  to  read  most  carefully. 

"Often  troops  are  seen  at  different  times  and  at 
different  places,  or  are  reported  by  observers  in 
different  ways.  Sometimes  one  may  be  in  doubt 
whether,  in  a  particular  case,  the  same  troops  or 
different  ones  are  meant.  However,  careful  attention 
to  conditions  of  distance  and  time  as  well  as  re- 
ference to  the  map  and  the  use  of  dividers  will  make 
matters  clear. 

'The  troops,  both  our  own  and  the  enemy's, 
must  then  be  located  in  relation  to  the  terrain.  It 
is  not  enough  to  know  that  they  are  standing  or 
marching  at  a  certain  place;  much  more  depends 
upon  their  relation  to  the  important  features  of  the 
terrain. 

"In  order  to  further  our  observations,  it  is  well 
to  mark  on  the  map  the  positions,  march  columns, 
etc.,  of  both  parties,  with  single  strokes  of  the 
colored  pencil.  In  the  case  of  march  columns  the 
exact  location  of  the  main  elements  of  the  Eed  ad- 
vance guard,  main  body,  etc.,  will  prove  to  be  of 
importance. 

"The  information  received  in  regard  to  the 
enemy  and  occasionally  also  in  regard  to  friendly 


—30— 

subdivisions  may,  however,  be  several  hours  or  even 
days  old.  Many  changes  may  have  taken  place 
meanwhile.  Especially  as  concerns  the  enemy  are 
we  likely  to  be  groping  in  the  dark.  Our  only  solu- 
tion is  to  take  for  granted  that  the  enemy  has  mean- 
while done  that  which  would  be  the  most  correct 
course  for  him  and  therefore  the  most  disadvanta- 
geous for  us.  If  he  has  adopted  a  different  course 
the  advantage  is  so  much  the  more  on  our  side. 

"Our  next  step  is  to  ask  what  the  leader,  whose 
place  in  the  problem  we  must  assume,  actually  would, 
or  should  do.  His  intention  or  his  mission  must  be 
kept  in  agreement  with  the  view  which  we  have 
gained  of  the  forces  on  both  sides  and  of  the  terrain, 
and  must  be  scrutinized  with  a  view  to  the  adoption 
of  the  best  means  for  reaching  the  previous  goal,  or 
to  see  whether  the  situation  has  changed  and  a  new 
decision  is  necessary. 

"An  officer  of  sound  tactical  judgment,  strength- 
ened by  frequent  practice  in  all  sorts  of  individual 
cases,  will  come  to  the  correct  decision. 

"For  those  of  less  experience  the  following  prin- 
ciples are  set  down. 

"1.  One  must  strive  to  exert  a  stronger  will 
power  than  his  opponent ;  i.  e.,  must  never  allow 
himself  to  give  up  his  own  purpose  or  mission  by 
reason  of  information  received  regarding  the  enemy, 
unless  it  becomes  clearly  evident  that  the  premises, 
on  which  his  intention  or  mission  was  founded,  have 
become  valueless.  Furthermore  one  should,  as  a 
matter  of  principle,  try  to  thwart  the  intentions  of 
the  opponent  as  soon  as  they  become  apparent. 

"2.  On  the  other  hand  one  must  never  stick 
stubbornly  to  the  execution  of  every  detail  of  pre- 
viously made  plans,  when  difficulties  become  ap- 
parent ;  it  is  enough  to  accomplish  the  main  purpose. 

"3.  One  must  always  assume  that  the  enemy 
will  adopt  the  course  of  action  most  disadvantageous 
to  ourselves,  and  take  measures  accordingly. 

"4.  If  it  becomes  evident  that  the  enemy 
either  on  account  of  faulty  orders  or  unfavorable 
circumstances,  has  been  placed  at  a  disadvantage, 
we  must  naturally  seek  at  once  the  best  .means  of 


—31— 

turning  this  to  our  own  advantage,  and  no  time 
must  be  left  the  enemy  to  improve  his  situation. 

"5.  If  our  own  situation  impels  us  to  employ 
forces  in  two  different  directions,  we  must  bear  in 
mind  that  a  separation  into  two  equal  parts  is  nearly 
always  a  mistake. 

"As  strong  forces  as  possible  should  be  used  in 
the  main  undertaking,  the  fewest  numbers  possible 
for  minor  purposes. 

"6.  We  must  never  take  half  measures,  but  in 
all  cases  arrive  at  a  full  and  definite  decision  and 
express  it  definitely.  An  indefinite  manner  of  ex- 
pression, with  a  loophole  for  escape  in  case  of  un- 
favorable outcome,  is  inadmissible. 

"Whenever  it  is  possible  to  solve  the  problem 
by  attacking,  this  course  should  be  followed,  nor 
should  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  deterred  by  superior 
hostile  forces  or  by  the  uncertainty  of  the  situation. 
By  taking  every  advantage  of  the  terrain  and  by 
concentrating  our  forces  at  a  decisive  point  even 
weaker  forces  may  gain  a  decision.  In  threatening 
situations,  an  attack  is  often  the  only  means  to 
safety;  such  an  attack  crosses  the  intentions  of  the 
enemy,  prevents  him  from  closing  in  the  net  about 
us  undisturbed,  and  gains  for  our  side  the  advantage 
of  morale. 

"7.  If  the  situation  has  actually  changed  we 
must  endeavor  to  ascertain  what  kind  of  a  new 
decision  will  best  serve  the  advantage  of  the  whole. 
This  is  always  the  main  point,  not  the  individual 
successes  of  the  subordinate  organizations.  In  fact, 
these  latter  must  sometimes  be  sacrificed  when  de- 
manded by  the  welfare  of  the  larger  organization. 

"The  decision  of  the  commander  is  expressed, 
as  far  as  the  troops  are  concerned,  by  the  order.  In 
most  cases,  however,  it  would  be  premature  and  of- 
ten quite  wrong  to  tell  in  this  order  where  and  how 
we  intend  to  fight.  Conditions  may  have  changed- 
before  we  meet  the  enemy ;  the  terrain  may  in  actual 
fact  be  quite  different  from  what  it  appears  to  be 
on  the  map.  In  such  cases,  measures  already  taken 
would  have  to  be  recalled  and  new  ones  substituted 
in  the  very  face  of  the  enemy — a  very  bad  business 


—32— 

indeed !  In  most  cases,  therefore,  no  orders  can  be 
given,  except  to  march  against  the  enemy.  All 
further  plans  belong  in  reality  to  the  reasons  for 
the  order,  and  even  here  we  should  not  reach  too  far 
into  the  future." 

The  following  cautions  were  written  for  the 
Line  Class.  Some  of  them  may  perhaps  be  of  as- 
sistance to  the  Special  Class. 

You  will  find  two  theories  extant  as  to  the  best 
way  to  make  high  marks  in  the  problems  of  this 
School.  The  followers  of  one  decide  very  promptly 
after  taking  up  the  problem,  by  intuition  largely  I 
suppose,  upon  its  solution,  then  write  the  order  in 
accordance  with  that  decision,  and  feeling  them- 
selves securely  intrenched  in  time,  start  to  spend 
the  remainder  of  the  morning  on  an  elaborate  argu- 
ment, miscalled  an  estimate  of  the  situation,  in  sup- 
port of  their  action. 

Usually  along  about  11-00  o'clock,  when  only  an 
hour  is  left  for  the  completion  of  the  solution,  its 
author  suddenly  realizes  that  his  early  decision  was 
hopelessly  wrong;  that  all  his  writing  so  far  is 
wasted;  and  that  he  now  has  one  hour  instead  of 
four  in  which  to  prepare  his  solution.  The  gain  in 
this  method  is  supposed  to  be  that,  in  writing  'the 
order  first,  the  student  will  not  be  surprised  by  the 
passage  of  time  and  obliged  to  turn  in  a  paper  at 
the  close  minus,  perhaps  its  most  important  element, 
the  order.  The  answer  is,  keep  a  watch  before  you 
and  work  on  a  schedule  as  previously  recommended 
in  these  notes. 

The  other  method  is  radically  different.  Those 
who  choose  it,  make  the  estimate  of  the  situation  a 
process  of  reasoning.  They  endeavor  to  keep  an 
open  mind  as  to  the  proper  plan  of  action  until  they 
have  systematically  considered  all  of  the  factors  en- 


—33— 

tering  into  the  problem,  and  the  advantages  and  dis- 
advantages of  each  practicable  plan  of  action ;  then, 
when  all  this  has  been  methodically  written  down, 
the  whole  is  reviewed,  advantages  and  disadvan- 
tages are  weighed,  and  the  plan  selected  which  seems 
to  promise  most.  Then,  and  then  only,  is  the  de- 
cision made. 

The  first  method  will  usually  give  a  much  better 
argument,  in  which  advantages  of  the  course  se- 
lected are  emphasized  and  disadvantages  minimized. 
But  the  latter  will  give  a  better  estimate;  that  is, 
the  conclusions  and  decisions  are  much  more  likely 
to  be  correct.  And  the  decision  is  what  counts  both 
in  the  field  and  in  the  map  room.  I  do  not  believe  an 
instructor's  views  as  to  the  proper  decision  are  ever 
changed  by  some  bit  of  ingenious  special  pleading 
in  a  student's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

Now  the  final  summing  up  and  deciding  does 
not  mean  that  there  have  not  been  partial  decisions 
earlier  in  the  estimate.  For  example,  in  the  usual 
case,  but  not  always,  before  it  is  profitable  to  con- 
sider how  to  attack  or  defend,  one  should  decide 
which  form  of  combat,  offensive  or  defensive,  to 
adopt. 

Remember  that  all  problems  cannot  be  solved  by 
one  mechanical  schedule.  Except  for  the  broad  gen- 
eral divisions :  namely,  consideration  of  our  mission, 
of  the  enemy,  of  our  forces,  and  of  possible  plans, 
each  problem  should  have  a  scheme  for  itself.  What 
is  logical  in  one  case  will  not  be  entirely  so  in  any 
other  one. 

Be  sure  that  the  action  decided  upon  for  your 
particular  command  fits  into  the  general  scheme. 
Do  not,  in  order  to  secure  a  brilliant  local  success, 
run  the  risk  of  jeopardizing  the  success  of  the  gen- 
eral engagement  taking  place  somewhere  else.  In 


—34— 

other  words,  play  with  the  team  and  not  individually. 

Remember  also  that  a  good  solution  well  carried 
out,  in  the  field  or  in  the  map  room,  is  better  than 
indecision  or  a  fatal  waste  of  time  in  hunting  for  the 
perfect  solution.  Many  a  fine  solution  has  been  ut- 
terly ruined  because,  with  the  four  hours  nearly  gone, 
the  student,  seized  by  a  panic,  tried  to  reverse  his 
whole  decision  and  plan  of  action.  Take  ample  time 
and  thought  at  arriving  at  a  decision,  but  when  one 
is  reached  stick  to  it. 

And  then  when  you  come  to  the  order  be  sure 
that  the  latter  will  carry  into  effect  the  precise  plan 
you  have  determined  upon.  Be  sure  that  the  decision 
and  the  order  are  in  complete  agreement,  and  re- 
member that  the  finest  tactical  decision  is  of  little 
value  unless  it  is  embodied  in  a  clear  distinct  order 
that  will  convey  to  each  subordinate  a  very  definite 
idea  of  the  part  he  is  to  play. 

In  your  order,  do  not  provide  far  into  the  fu- 
ture. If,  for  example,  your  enemy  is  a  number  of 
miles  away  and  your  decision  is  to  march  to  attack 
him,  simply  issue  a  march  order ;  not  as  is  frequently 
done,  a  combination  of  march  and  attack  order.  By 
the  time  your  forces  have  marched  to  the  enemy's 
vicinity,  you  are  likely  to  find  a  radically  different 
situation  from  the  one  expected,  and  in  fact  find 
yourself  confronted  by  an  entirely  new  problem 
which  requires  its  own  solution.  In  the  map  room 
solve  simply  the  problem  that  the  instructor  pre- 
sents you.  Do  not  build  on  top  of  the  one  he  gives 
you  another  one  for  some  time  much  further  into  the 
future,  and  then  proceed  to  solve  that  too. 

Let  me  urge  again  that  you  arrange  your 
schedule  of  work  for  each  problem  so  that  it  in- 
cludes from  fifteen  minutes  to  half  an  hour,  prefer- 
ably the  latter,  for  a  careful  review  of  your  own  so- 


—35— 

lution,  not  for  a  reversal  of  all  your  previous  work, 
but  for  the  detection  of  the  errors  that  creep  in, 
particularly  into  the  order.  And  compel  yourself 
to  adhere  to  that  schedule  and  to  make  this  review. 
Be  yourself  the  first  critic  of  your  own  paper,  and  by 
the  elimination  of  the  little  errors  you  find,  gain 
many  tenths  in  your  marks. 

Do  not  write  an  estimate  of  the  situation  unless 
one  is  called  for.  Estimates  are  usually  required  un- 
til the  division  and  troop  leading  problems  are  reach- 
ed, but  not  always.  To  write  down  an  estimate  when 
not  called  for  usually  means  the  problem  cannot  be 
completed  in  the  allotted  time.  It  also  usually  brings 
cuts  for  its  own  sake.  Yet  it  is  frequently  done. 
Read  the  requirements  of  each  problem  carefully. 

Do  not  waste  time  in  criticizing  the  problem. 
No  problem  is  perfect ;  the  particular  one  may  seem 
to  you  very  asinine.  Much  information  may  be 
omitted  that  you  think  you  ought  to  have.  You 
may  not  be  able  to  conceive  how  any  command  could 
find  itself  in  such  a  fix.  But  do  not  waste  time 
in  such  speculation  and  do  not  let  the  problem, 
because  of  its  silliness,  get  you  into  a  frame  of  mind 
that  prevents  good  work.  Take  the  problem  as  it  is 
and  make  the  best  of  it.  Students  frequently  spend 
hours  in  fuming  over  the  faults  in  the  statement  of 
the  situation  instead  of  working  out  its  solution. 

Do  not  "bone  instructor/'  Solve  the  problem 
on  its  merits.  You  will  probably  have  lots  of  advice 
to  the  contrary,  but  if  you  take  mine,  you  will  omit 
all  thought  of  the  particular  instructor  and  of  his 
idiosyncracies.  By  considering  his  peculiar  ways 
of  doing  things  you  might  occasionally  pick  up  a 
tenth,  but  meantime  you  will  have  wasted  time  that 
put  properly  into  legitimate  work  would  have  gained 
you  units. 


—36— 

The  mistake  is  frequently  made  of  considering 
that  your  enemy  is  inactive.  A  message  is  received 
which  says  that  the  enemy  at  a  certain  time  was 
passing  a  certain  place.  The  student  goes  ahead 
and  solves  his  problem  upon  the  assumption  that  the 
enemy  is  still  there,  when  if  the  hostile  forces  have 
continued  to  march,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  they  may  be 
many  miles  from  the  place  where  reported  and  so 
close  at  hand  as  to  render  impossible  all  of  the 
measures  determined  upon  by  the  student.  Careful 
consideration  of  the  elements  of  time  and  space,  not 
only  for  your  own  troops,  but  for  the  enemy's  as 
well,  is  a  necessity  in  almost  all  problems.  When 
you  figure  where  your  plan  may  take  your  troops 
up  to  a  certain  time,  be  sure  that  you  also  figure 
where  the  enemy's  troops,  if  advancing  in  the  direc- 
tion to  cause  you  the  most  trouble,  will  be  at  that 
same  time. 

Do  not  spoil  your  solution  by  simply  careless 
mistakes  in  calculations  of  road  spaces  and  distances. 
If  you,  as  an  advance  guard  commander,  are  ordered 
to  precede  the  main  body  by  a  half  a  mile,  do  not 
figure  your  time  of  starting  so  that  your  order  will 
make  a  gap  of  three  miles. 

Remember  that  neatness  in  your  work  is  neces- 
sary to  an  understanding  by  the  reader  and  a  lack 
thereof  may  be  commented  upon.  Particularly  is 
neatness  required  in  the  sketches  sometimes  called 
for.  Unless  clear,  they  may  be  rejected  at  the  stu- 
dent's expense. 

For  ease  in  rapidly  noting  relative  heights  on 
the  maps,  some  officers  prefer  to  line  out  the  100 
or  50  foot  contours  in  different  inks,  and  sometimes 
this  scheme  is  elaborated  upon  by  coloring  all  areas 
between  certain  contours.  It  depends  upon  the  in- 
dividual whether  these  schemes  are  of  value  or  not. 


—37— 

Read  your  "Instructions  for  Written  Exercises" 
with  care  and  conform  thereto. 

Now,  before  bringing  this  talk  to  an  end,  I 
would  like  to  suggest  that  no  one  permit  himself  to 
become  discouraged  if  at  first  he  does  not  seem  to  be 
getting  the  best  results  in  his  map  problem  work. 
The  year  contains  many  problems  and  the  race  is  by 
no  means  always  to  the  man  who  makes  the  best 
start.  Quite  frequently,  on  the  contrary,  the  winner 
is  the  one  who  learns  from  every  error  made,  and  by 
consistent  plugging  is  going  strongest  at  the  finish. 
Do  not  think  a  good  start  is  not  of  value ;  every  one 
should  get  the  best  he  can,  but  on  the  other  hand,  do 
not  think  that  all  is  lost  because  at  first  the  standing 
is  not  high.  No  man  stands  one  in  every  series,  and 
no  man  is  likely  to  stand  one  in  every  problem  of 
any  series.  Most  men  take  their  turn  in  striking 
the  bottom. 

The  following  outline  does  not  require  much 
distortion  to  make  it  applicable  to  the  solution  of 
most  tactical  problems.  It  is  submitted,  however, 
simply  as  an  aid  to  one  beginning  such  work.  It 
should  not  be  applied  mechanically  to  each  problem, 
but  should  be  changed  in  accordance  with  the  logical 
requirements  of  the  particular  situation.  Yet,  it 
will  be  found  that  the  main  parts,  namely:  The 
Mission,  Enemy,  Our  Own  Forces,  Plans  of  Action, 
and  Decision,  will  usually  appear  in  a  good  estimate 
and,  usually  also,  in  the  order  stated. 

I.     THE  ESTIMATE  OF  THE  SITUATION: 
a.  THE    MISSION:     (Brief). 


—38— 

b.  THE  ENEMY: 

1.  Strength; 

2.  Position; 

3.  Movements; 

4.  Probable   Intentions; 

c.  OUR  OWN  FORCES: 

1.  Strength; 

2.  Position; 

3.  Supporting  Troops; 

d.  PLANS  OF  ACTION: 

e.  THE  DECISION  (Brief) 
II.     THE  ORDERS. 


Influence  of 


Terrain ; 
Weather; 
Climate ; 
Soil; 
Morale,  etc. 


(NOTE:     Quotations  from  the  sayings  of  Moltke  are  from 
the  German  of  L.  Hauschild.) 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


LD  21-95m-7,'37 


Gaylord  Bros. 

Makers 

Syracuse,  N.  Y. 
PAT,  JAN.  21 ,1908 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


